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researcher would like to generalize her results, is those members of the general population who would take the new treatment if it were approved for sale. My main findings are as follows. First, in the absence of a conventional alternative therapy that is available outside the trial, clinical trials do not suffer from self-selection. The reason is that all members of the population of interest would enroll in the trial.
Second, even if there is a conventional therapy, the only patients who engage in self-selection are those who believe the new treatment superior to conventional treatment and conventional treatment superior to no treatment. For these individuals, my primary finding is that, as the probability of randomization into active treatment (as opposed to placebo control) rises, the average effect of the new treatment on the trial population falls. The reason is that the higher the probability of treatment, the less optimistic a patient has to be about the new treatment (relative to conventional treatment) in order for her to prefer enrolling in a trial -a lottery between the new treatment and no treatment -over the nontrial alternative -certain consumption of conventional treatment. I verify this prediction with a data set of outcomes from over 120 trials of anti-ulcer medications with different probabilities of treatment.
An important implication of this finding is that self-selection causes the standard estimate of treatment effects -the difference between average outcomes in the new-treatment and placebocontrol groups -to have a positive bias. The reason is that medical trials always have a probability of treatment less than one, whereas outside the trial context a patient who takes the new treatment would do so with certainty, i.e., with probability equal one. If outcomes fall with higher probability of treatment, then outcomes in the real world must be smaller than outcomes in a trial. In my sample of ulcer trials, I estimate that selection bias accounts for roughly half of treatment effects for two medications (H 2 -blockers and proton-pump inhibitors) and can reverse the sign of treatment effects for a third medication (prostaglandins) .
My third finding is that an alternative experimental design which permits patients to choose among treatment lotteries can eliminate bias from self-selection. In this design patients are offered a choice between (a) a lottery over new treatment and placebo or (b) a lottery over new treatment and conventional control. All patients in the population of interest, i.e. those who prefer new treatment, would enroll. Those that prefer conventional treatment to no treatment would simply enroll in the second lottery. The cost of this design is that one cannot identify the effect of new treatment relative to no treatment on these patients, but that information is not very valuable because these patients would take conventional therapy rather than no treatment if the new treatment were not available.
Although there is an extensive economics literature on selfselection across treatment and control groups in non-randomized studies, there is less discussion of self-selection across study participation and non-participation in the context of randomized experiments. That which exists notes that self-selection into a study is not a problem so long as one is interested only in the effect of treatment on the treated. If one is interested in treatment effects among a broader population, however, the participation decision may introduce what is called randomization bias (Heckman, 1992; Heckman and Smith, 1995; Heckman, 1996) . The limited literature on randomization bias does not model the behavior that generates this bias, as this paper does, but merely attempts to demonstrate empirically that such bias exists (Heckman, 1992; Kamoinka and Lacroix, 2002) . 3 The literature on self-selection in non-randomized studies does not exhaust the analytic insights possible with randomized experiments because the lottery aspect of the latter permits greater theoretical structure to be placed on models of selfselection behavior. This reduces the work that must be done by data to identify the effects of selection.
In the ''statistics for medicine'' literature there is little discussion of patient self-selection into medical trials. Rather, the focus is on the selection of patients by doctors into trials, either via recruitment (see, e.g., Senore et al. (1999) ) or exclusion criteria (see, e.g., Ellenberg (1994) and Robinson et al. (1996) ). Physician-selection might alter the impact patient self-selection has on estimates of treatment effects to the extent that it causes a deviation from random sampling from the population of interest. I leave that interesting question for future research. The few papers there are on the participation decision by patients merely attempt to survey the reasons why patients choose not to participate in a medical trial (see, e.g., Verheggen et al. (1998) and Britton et al. (1999)) or to document differences between the characteristics of patients who choose to enroll and those who do not (see, e.g., Olschewski et al. (1992) and Britton et al. (1999) ), without drawing conclusion about the impact of the differences on estimates of treatment effects.
The paper may be outlined as follows. Section 1 sets forth my model of self-selection into clinical trials. Section 2 test the predictions of my model against a data set of outcomes from ulcer trials. Section 3 proposes and evaluates an alternative trial design to estimate treatment effects without bias due to self-selection.
3 One ostensible exception is Philipson (2000) , which examines the effect of changes in the proportion of a population that is treated on the treatment effect in that population. The distinction between that work and the present paper is twofold. First, in Philipson's paper, differences in the treatment probability change the treatment effect in the population (because of externalities of treatment on those not treated). In this paper, however, differences in the treatment probability change the sampling of treatment effects, not the treatment effects themselves. Second, Philipson is concerned with bias in estimates of the effect of treatment on the treated. I am concerned with the bias in estimates for a broader population.
Model of patient self-selection

Setup
Let us begin with some building blocks for the model. Assume an ill patient faces two possible future health states: continued illness y or recoveryȳ. 4 Utility in these states is U = u(y) andŪ = u(ȳ), respectively. I will discuss three treatments for the patient's ailment, indexed by k: no treatment (k = 0), a new treatment (k = 1), and conventional treatment (k = 2). Let y k be a random variable that gives the patient's health outcome following treatment k and define p k as the probability of recovery with treatment k: p k = Pr {y k =ȳ}. Let π k be a patient's belief about p k . In general, π k would be a distribution function, but it will make no difference to the analysis if it is a point estimate and so I shall assume that. In order for self-selection to affect estimates of treatment effects, it must be that there is heterogeneity of treatment effects and of beliefs about treatment effects in the population. Let g (p, π) be the joint probability distribution function for chances of recovery p = (p 0 , p 1 , p 2 ) and for beliefs π = (π 0 , π 1 , π 2 ) about these chances.
The assumption that patients have defined beliefs about treatment effects requires some clarification and perhaps justification, at least with regard to the new treatment. I do not assume that patients know their response to new treatment, only that they have beliefs about the value of that treatment. These beliefs could be based on experience with related compounds, experience that the patients have previously responded well or poorly to treatments generally, news reports about the new treatment, advice from personal doctors, or information about the average value of all new treatments. The beliefs could be wrong -though I will rule out a particular type of wrong in Section 1.3. While it would be useful to explore the source of beliefs about new treatment, it should not be controversial to assume that beliefs exist.
In order to formally model a medical trial, one needs to specify its design. My focus will be on blinded, randomized, placebocontrolled trials -the gold-standard according to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration. From the patient's perspective, the trial is a lottery over assignment to new treatment or the placebo. Let d be the probability of assignment to the new treatment arm. This probability is revealed to patients during the informed consent process. 5 The purpose of blinding is to prevent patients in the control arm from leaving or simultaneously seeking treatment outside the trial. In my analysis, blinding implies that researchers control the lottery payoffs that patients are offered. Without it, patients would, in effect, be able to pick the control arm payoff.
I assume that patients decide to enroll in a clinical trial if and only if their expected utility from the trial is greater than their expected utility from treatment outside the trial. To ensure that this choice has bite, I assume that the new treatment is only available through the trial. Otherwise no patients would enroll in trials without monetary compensation, which is generally limited to out-of-pocket expenses.
6 I also assume that it is the utility of health and not the disutility of foregone consumption due to the cost of treatment that drives enrollment in clinical trials. This assumption may be justified by the aforementioned limit on monetary compensation and the fact that patients typically have health insurance that covers the marginal cost of care. In order to fully characterize the patient's choice problem, note initially that expected utility from consumption of treatment k is
Expected utility outside the trial depends on whether the patient would choose no treatment or conventional treatment. Assuming that the patient chooses among these treatments on the same basis as she chooses whether to enroll in a trial, expected utility outside a trial is max {EU 0 , EU 2 }.
Whereas outside the trial the patient has her choice of treatments, inside the trial she experiences a lottery over treatments. Because treatments themselves are lotteries over health states, the trial is actually a compound lottery over health states. Expected utility from the trial is
The patient's choice between treatment within and without the trial will solve max {EU T , max {EU 0 , EU 2 }}. This problem can be rewritten in an intuitive manner with a simple transformation of variables. Letp k = p k − p 0 be the health benefit of treatment k relative to no treatment, andπ k = π k − π 0 be the patient's belief about this treatment k effect. Now the patient's problem becomes max {dπ 1 , max {0,π 2 }} .
( 1) In other words, the patient's choice is between (a) a chance d at a treatment effect ofπ 1 with the new treatment, and (b) a certain treatment effect of 0 with no treatment or ofπ 2 with conventional treatment, whichever is greater.
An immediate implication of (1) is that risk aversion does not affect patient selection into medical trials. The reason is that outcomes are assumed to be binary. Therefore, if two lotteries offer the same expected outcome, they must also offer the same variation in outcomes. If health outcomes were continuous and one treatment offered a tighter distribution over outcomes than another, however, risk aversion might affect a patient's decision to enroll in a trial. That said, risk aversion would not, on the margin, always discourage enrollment in a trial. If the new treatment had lower outcome variance than conventional treatment or no treatment, a trial would attract the risk averse patient, ceteris paribus. 
Baseline
In order to determine whether and how self-selection introduces bias into estimates of treatment effects, one must specify the population of patients in which the researcher is interested. If the population is simply those that enroll in the trial, i.e., one is interested in the effect of ''treatment on the treated,'' then it is well established that randomization eliminates self-selection bias. In my analysis, however, the population of interest is those patients who would take the new treatment if it were available outside the medical trial, i.e. patients who believe treatment effects of new treatment are superior to either no treatment or conventional treatment 9 :
The rationale is that it is these patients who are most likely to consume the new treatment if approved following the medical trial. 10 Note that the trial population -those patients for whom dπ 1 > max {0,π 2 } -is a subset of my population of interest. Everyone who enrolls in a medical trial meets the conditions for membership in the population of interest becausẽ
Some researchers may be interested in treatment effects among the whole population of patients. To these researchers, the ideal trial would enroll randomly selected patients from the population. In order to analyze bias from self-selection in this case, I recommend separating the population of interest into two subgroups: those who prefer new treatment (my population of interest) and those who do not. Total bias is the populationweighted average of bias in each of these groups. I will address selection bias in the group that does not prefer new treatment at the tail end of the next subsection.
Implications
Selection bias is defined to be the difference between treatment effects in the trial population and in the population of interest:
where y =ȳ − y. Bias arises from mismatches between the trial population and the population of interest (both of which are defined by patients' beliefs) that affect the sampling of treatment effects in a medical trial.
This description immediately highlights two cases where there is no bias from self-selection. The first is where there is no correlation between beliefs about treatment effects and actual treatment effects. Although there is self-selection based on beliefs, sampling of treatment effects remains random. The second case is where there is no conventional control. The condition for membership in the trial population and for membership in the population of interest converge toπ 1 > 0. All patients who prefer the new treatment will enroll in a medical trial regardless of the probability of receiving it because the worst case outcome (placebo control) is as good as the only therapy available outside the trial (no treatment).
11
In reality, these conditions are uncommon, which is why selfselection warrants medical researchers' attention. In order to get theoretical traction on the bias from self-selection, I make two substantive assumptions. First, there is a positive correlation between a patient's beliefs about treatment effects and her actual treatment effects. More formally, (A1)p 1i = f (π 1i ) +ε 1i , where i indexes individual patients,ε 1i can be thought of as prediction error by patients, f > 0, andε 1i is mean-independent ofπ 1i . The assumption of positive correlation is reasonable. It is consistent 9 One objection to this definition is that the doctor and not the patient chooses the latter's treatment. But the same could be said of the study participation decision -the doctor determines whether the patient will enroll in a medical trial. In that case, one should simply substitute the treating physician's beliefs for the patient's belief in the analysis. 10 I address the problem of learning in the conclusion.
11 A related case immune to randomization bias is where there is a conventional treatment, it is the control treatment in the medical trial, and all patients prefer conventional treatment to no treatment. In this case, the worst outcome from the trial -conventional control -is at least as good as the perceived best treatment available outside the trial.
with patients under-or over-estimating the effects of treatment. The opposite case, a negative correlation between beliefs and outcomes, is implausible, implying that patients who respond well to treatment systematically believe treatment is worse than patients who respond poorly to treatment.
12
Following Heckman and Honore (1990) , let (µ 1 , µ 2 ) and Σ be the mean of (lnπ 1i , lnπ 2i ) for allπ ki > 0, k = 1, 2.
13 Define
My second assumption is that (A2) V i is mean-independent of D i . This assumption is satisfied if (lnπ 1i , lnπ 2i ) are uncorrelated or if (lnπ 1i , lnπ 2i ) is distributed bivariate normal. It is also satisfied for certain classes of Poisson, binomial and gamma distributions (Lancaster, 1959; Hunter, 1972) . More general conditions can be found in Lancaster (1959) and Leipnik (1961) .
These assumptions yield the central insight of this paper: so long as the correlation between the treatment effects of the new therapy and of the conventional therapy are not too great, an increase in the probability of assignment to new treatment will lower estimates of the treatment effect of the new therapy from the medical trial. More formally,
The proof can be found in Appendix A.1. The logic, however, is that the trial only attracts patients who believe that the benefit of the new treatment is so great than, even with a probability 1 − d of obtaining no treatment at all, the trial offers a better expected outcome than conventional treatment. As the probability of assignment to new treatment increases, the perceived benefit of the trial rises. Some patients who were not optimistic enough about the new treatment to have previously enrolled, will now do so. This will lower the average beliefs about the new treatment's effect among enrollees. Since expected treatment effects are monotonically increasing in beliefs, average treatment effects rise with average beliefs.
14 12 Under certain conditions, assumption (A1) admits a rational expectations formulation of beliefs about treatment effects, i.e., f (π ki ) =π ki and E (ε ki ) = 0.
The conditions are dictated by the assumption thatε ki is mean-independent ofπ ki . An example of a sufficient condition for a rational expectations formulation is that
13 To avoid the problem that one cannot take logs of non-positive number, add a constant to outcomes in the binary case such that they lie in, e.g., [1, 3] rather than [−1, 1]. The approach in the text is acceptable since only subjects for whom π 1i >π 2i > 0 will change their enrollment decisions in response to changes in the probability of treatment d. 14 A medical researcher may also be interested in the effect of self-selection on the variance of outcomes because the variance affects sample size calculations and the statistical significance of treatment effects. In general, it is not possible to sign the effect of patient self-selection on the variance of outcomes. The reason is that there are no simple restrictions on f that translate the sign of a change in variance ofπ 1i into the sign of change in variance ofp 1i , which equals f (π 1i ) +ε 1i . This is not a problem in the special case where f is linear, which includes the case where patients have rational expectations. The reason is that when f is linear, an increase (decrease) in the variance ofπ 1i implies an increase (decrease) in the variance of p 1i . (Recall that by assumption f > 0.) In the linear case, the sign of the effect of selection on variance will depend on whether the distribution of log beliefs is log-concave or log-convex. If the distribution of log beliefs is log-concave (logconvex), the variance of treatment effects in the sample will be greater (smaller) than the variance in the population of interest. (The proof would be similar to that of Proposition 1 but would employ Propositions 1 and 2 in Heckman and Honore (1990) rather than Theorems 1 and 2 in Hadar and Russell (1969) . Note that this result will not depend on the correlation between lnπ 1i and lnπ 2i because the Critical to the proposition is the condition that the correlation between beliefs about the efficacy of the new and conventional treatments is not too high. If that is violated, then a higher probability of obtaining the new treatment may attract not just patients with more pessimistic beliefs about the new treatment, but also those with more optimistic beliefs about the new treatment who nevertheless have not enrolled because they also have more optimistic beliefs about the conventional treatment. (Recall that patients enroll in the trial not merely becauseπ 1i is high, but because it is greater thanπ 2i /d.)
Fortunately, the condition on the correlation of beliefs about new and conventional treatment effects is rather lax. It is satisfied whenever the variance of beliefs about the new treatment is greater than the variance of beliefs about the conventional treatment, i.e., whenσ 2 1 ≥σ 2 2 , which is likely simply because the new treatment is new.
The economics behind Proposition 1 are identical to the Roy model (Roy, 1951; Heckman and Honore, 1990 ) of sorting of workers across sectors. In that model, workers have sector-specific skills with associated skill prices. A worker chooses the sector that offers her the highest income, which is the product of skill and skill price. The effect of a change in one skill price on the distribution of workers across sectors, and thus the average skill level in each sector, depends on distribution of skills among workers and the correlation of skills in each sector. This maps neatly onto the problem of self-selection into clinical trials. Here there are two sectors: the trial and no trial. Skills are treatment effects. And the skill price in the trial is the probability of receiving the new treatment while the skill price outside the trial is one.
The practical import of Proposition 1 is that self-selection introduces positive bias into standard estimates of treatment effects. To see this, note that taking new treatment outside a trial is equivalent to a trial where the probability of receiving new treatment is one, and that the entire population of interest would enroll in such a trial. Because treatment effects fall as the probability of treatment rises, it must be that consumption of the new treatment outside the trial (again, equivalent to a trial where the probability of treatment is one) must produce smaller treatment effects than new treatment in a trial (which generally has a probability of treatment below one). Indeed, a researcher could estimate the magnitude of bias if she had a number of trials with different probabilities of treatment. She would simply have to estimate the marginal effect of increases in the probability of treatment on estimates of treatment effects from individual trials and predict the treatment effect in a trial where the probability was one.
There are two circumstances in which selection bias may not be positive. First, if the medical trial offers significant monetary incentives for participation, then patients who prefer no treatment or conventional treatment may enroll. 15 In the former case, the bias is still positive because patients who prefer no treatment will have lower treatment effects than those who prefer new treatment, given the presumed positive correlation of beliefs and treatment effects. If patients who prefer conventional treatment take the bait, one cannot be sure treatment effects would be lower because there may be a number of patients who believe that both new treatment and conventional treatment are really good, but that conventional treatment is just slightly better. These patients may variance will be a function of a 2 1 > 0.) Verifying whether beliefs are distributed log-concave or log-convex is difficult because beliefs are unobservable. However, if ε 1i is distributed such thatp 1i falls in the same class of distributions asπ 1i , then the investigator can verify the distribution ofπ 1i by examining the distribution ofp 1i . 15 Harrison et al. (2005) find that monetary compensation increases the average level of risk aversion among subjects in a field experiment.
raise the average treatment effect in the trial. In practice, however, the number of such patients is likely to be small, especially if the correlation between new treatment and conventional treatment effects is not very large. Therefore, the selection bias will likely remain positive.
A second circumstance in which bias may not be positive is when the researcher cares about treatment effects in the general patient population. Now the baseline includes patients in my population of interest (those who prefer new treatment and for which selection bias is positive), plus all patients who prefer no treatment or conventional treatment. For the latter, the logic is similar to that for a monetary incentive. Among, in particular, those who prefer conventional treatment, the sign of bias is unclear because preferring conventional treatment may not imply that new treatment is less effective. So long as the correlation between new treatment and conventional treat is not too high, however, selection bias will remain positive. 
Application to ulcer trials
This section examines a data set of outcomes from 121 medical trials of three ulcer medications in order to test my model of patient self-selection. Proposition 1 provides the prediction to be tested: as the probability of treatment rises, estimated treatment effects should fall. The ulcer data confirm this prediction. Moreover, they suggest that selection bias is roughly half the size of treatment effects for two of the medications studied, and reverses the sign of treatment effects for the last medication.
Data
The data set includes the published results from clinical trials studying treatments for non-gastric ulcers. (The data set and citations for the specific studies included in the data set are available from the author.) Ulcers are the erosion of the mucous lining in the stomach or small intestine and are judged healeda binary outcome-via endoscopy by the researcher. Three classes of medication are considered. The first class, H 2 -blockers, was introduced in 1977, and is thought to prevent the production of acid in the stomach. The most popular brands are Tagamet (cimetidine), Zantac (ranitidine), and Pepcid (famotidine). The second class of medication, prostaglandins, was introduced in the mid-1980s and is thought to build up the mucous lining of the stomach and intestine. The most common prostaglandins are enprostil and misoprostil. The third class, proton-pump inhibitors (PPIs), were introduced after most prostaglandins, starting in 1989. Like H 2 -blockers, these medications prevent the production of acid in the stomach. The most popular brands are Prilosec (omeprazole), Nexium (esomeprazole) and Prevacid (lansoprazole).
17 Table 1 describes the design of the trials in the data set. There are three things to note. First, each of the trials is randomized, 16 There is a literature that attempts to identify the full distribution of treatment effects, though in its parlance the goal is to identify the Roy model. The data requirements, however, are typically beyond the capabilities of medical researchers. For example, they would need knowledge about either the distribution of conventional treatment effects among those who do not enroll in the trial or about the proportion of the general patient population that enrolls in the medical trial (Heckman and Honore, 1990 ). They do not, however, even know locally the size of this population. 17 A distinguishing feature of all three classes of medication is that they offer a much higher chance of healing an ulcer than do antacids or bismuth subcitrate, which are mainly palliatives. That being said, it is now recognized that 90% of nongastric ulcers are caused by the bacteria helicobacter pylori. These infections are usually treated with a combination of antibiotics and H 2 -blockers or PPIs. This paper examines trials where H 2 -blockers, prostaglandins or PPIs are used in isolation. These trials typically predate the switch to antibiotic-based treatments. double-blind, and parallel-armed, which means each patient is observed in only one treatment state. Trials employ either a placebo, palliative (antacid or bismuth subcitrate), or conventional control. I will group all the placebo and palliative controlled trials and simply call them placebo controlled. H 2 -blocker trials all employ placebo controls. Prostaglandin trials may employ either a placebo control or an H 2 -blocker control. PPI trials only employ H 2 -blockers as controls.
18 Second, the probability of treatment is calculated by taking the number of arms with the most advanced class of treatment and dividing by the total number of arms in the trial, on the theory that researchers intend to assign the same number of patients to each arm to maximize the power of comparisons across arms. (Where the numbers actually randomized to two different arms of a trial differ from this by a factor of greater than 1.5, the probability of treatment is calculated by inferring the number of subjects intended to be randomized to each arm and dividing the number that were to be randomized to treatment arms and dividing by the total number that were to be enrolled in the trial.) What introduces variation in the probability of treatment is that some trials examine multiple dosages or multiple brands of the same treatment. 19 Because each trial may have more than one treatment arm, there are more than twotimes as many arms as trials reported in Table 1 . Third, trials in my sample vary in the dates on which they measure treatment outcomes. Many also measure outcomes in an arm multiple times. As a result, there are more arm-date observations than there are arms.
The data set has two important limitations. First, the data contain observations only at the arm-date level, not at the patientdate level. For example, the data report the fraction of patients in an arm whose ulcer healed, but not whether an individual patient's ulcer healed. I ignore the problems raised by this sort of aggregation in the analysis below. Second, the trials in the data suffer from the attrition of patients. Average patient characteristics for an arm, however, are measured only on the date that patients are randomized to that arm. These averages are not updated as patients attrite out of an arm. The data also fail to measure outcomes for patients that attrite out of a trial. My analysis also ignores the problem of attrition. I assume that all patients that attrite out would have healed at the same rate as patients that remained in the trial, i.e. that attrition is random. 20 Table 2 presents summary statistics for health outcomes and the characteristics of trials, treatments and patients. Each observation is on a specific treatment arm at a specific measurement 18 There was one H 2 -blocker trial with conventional control and one PPI trial without a conventional control. I removed these because, without a second trial, there is no possibility of variation in probability of treatment within these groups. 19 While individuals may have different beliefs about efficacy of each class of treatment relative to the control, it is assumed that individuals do not have refined beliefs about the relative efficacy of different dosages of the same treatment or of different treatments in the same class of medication, e.g., cimetidine v. ranitidine among H 2 -blockers. 20 A more complete model would endogenize both selection into trials and attrition from trials. A natural starting point for a model of attrition is Philipson and DeSimone (1997) . In that model patients remain in the trial in order ''self-sample'' and refine their estimates of treatment effects. Since arm assignment is blinded, one might extend the model to allow that patients self-sample in order to identify the arm to which they have been randomized. Thus a model of endogenous attrition would resemble a model of job search where the worker did not know the market distribution of wages. Because an increase in the probability of treatment above one-half reduces uncertainty about arm assignment, one might hypothesize that, holding sampled treatment effects constant, patients would attrite more quickly the higher the probability of treatment is above one-half. The effect of an increase in the probability of treatment on estimated treatment effects, however, is ambiguous. On the one hand, a patient who has a bad draw on outcomes is less likely to attrite because she can be more confident that the bad draw does not indicate she was randomized to the control group. On the other hand, she is more likely to use her bad draw to revise downward her beliefs about the value of the new treatment and thus attrite because she would prefer the conventional treatment. In industry-sponsored studies (at least 47% of the sample), the purpose is to eliminate treatment non-responders and elevate estimates of treatment effects. The specific exclusion variable I measure is whether the trial excluded patients with any serious problem other than ulcers. Third, most ulcer trials without antacid as control still permit patients to consume antacids. The antacidpermitted variable is coded from 1 to 5. One indicates that subjects were prohibited from taking antacids, two that subjects were discouraged from taking antacids, three that subjects were permitted to take antacids (or the study did not counsel subjects on antacids), four that antacids were provided, and five that antacids were required.
Empirical strategy
Because the trials in the ulcer data take multiple measurements on the same patients, I estimate treatment effects using a duration model. Because the trial, treatment and patient characteristics variables for a given arm are time-invariant, I employ an exponential model for survival following assignment to treatment arm k of trial j and a constant baseline hazard: S jkt = exp(−λ(I jk , Z j , X jk )t), where survival in the aggregated ulcer data is the fraction of patients in an arm who still have an unhealed ulcer after t days of treatment. I adopt a simple linear parametrization for λ I jk , Z j , X jk = αI jk + βZ j + γX jk + ε jk , where I jk is a vector of indicator variables indicating the medication that patients receive in that arm; Z j is a vector of trial and treatment characteristics common to treatment and their matched control arms; X jk is a vector of treatment and patient characteristics unique to the treatment arm and measured at the start of the trial; and the error term captures variation due to unobserved average characteristics of patients. I assume the errors are independent of I jk , Z j , X jk and are independent across arms with mean zero and variance σ jk . Notes. Each observation is a measurement on a treatment arm in a trial. Observations are weighted such that each arm makes a contribution to estimates in proportion to the number of patients in the arm, regardless of the number of measurements made on each patient.
Taking logs and dividing by −t, the model can be written:
I posit a similar model for survival in control arms k , though that model omits common trial and treatment characteristics. Treatment effects are estimated by comparing outcomes in treatment arms to those in matched control arms. Therefore, I estimate a single-difference version of the (3) that compares each treatment arm k to its corresponding control arm k at date t:
where, for convenience, I jkk are written as indicators for different treatment k/control k combinations. Proposition 1 suggests that self-selection of patients is driven by the probability of treatment in a trial. To test this hypothesis I include as regressors the interactions between treatment/control indicators and d j , the probability of treatment in trial j. Proposition 1 predicts specifically predicts that θ should be negative.
I estimate (4) by feasible GLS. 21 Each observation is a measurement on a treatment arm/matched control pair in a trial. Observations are weighted such that each arm makes a contribution to estimates in proportion to the number of patients in the arm, regardless of the number of measurements taken on each patient. This weighting does not materially alter the results. Standard errors are calculated assuming group-wise heteroskedasticity at the trial-level. Four specifications of the right hand side of (4) are employed. Specification (1) includes indicators for different treatment/control pairs, the interactions between these indicators and the probability of treatment d j , and trial characteristics (exclusion criteria and exclusion criteria interacted with d j ); (2) includes (1) plus treatment characteristics (antacid 21 Although the right hand side is the relative hazard rate into healing and this rate is in [−1, 1], it is entirely appropriate to estimate the model using a simple linear regression. The reason is that the dependent variable, as a theoretical matter, can range from [−∞, ∞]. Moreover, because individuals in an arm are aggregated, the error term is more likely to resemble a normal distribution.
role, daily frequency of medication, total daily dosage interacted with class of ulcer medication) and control characteristics (total daily dosage interacted with whether the control is an H 2 -blocker); (3) includes (1) plus patient characteristics (male, smoker, log age) in the treatment arm interacted with class of treatment and patient characteristics in the control arm interacted with whether the control is an H 2 -blocker; and (4) includes all of the above. The results are robust to common sense modifications of these specifications, including further interactions with d j . Table 3 presents the core results from estimation of Eq. (4). The main finding is that coefficient estimates for the interaction of trial indicators and the probability of treatment -reported in the second section of panel C -are uniformly negative. Nearly all are statistically significant. This strongly supports Proposition 1.
Results
In order to interpret the coefficient estimates, keep in mind, first, that the dependent variable can be interpreted as the difference in the average daily healing rate among patients in the treatment arm and patients in the control arm. So if there are 100 patients in both the treatment and control arms and the dependent variable is, say, .05, the proper interpretation is that 5 more patients healed in the treatment arm than in the control arm. Second, the median medical trial assigns 50% of patients to the treatment arm. Therefore, my estimate of treatment effects in the typical H 2 -blocker trials (under specification 1) is 0.017 (0.03, the coefficient on the H 2 -blocker trial indicator, plus 0.5 times −0.026, the coefficient on the interaction between probability of treatment and the H 2 -blocker trial indicator). Estimates of treatment effects in 50% trials for other medications and covariate specifications are presented in Panel A of Table 4 . Third, predictions of treatment effects without selection bias are identical to predictions of treatment effects in a trial where 100% of patients are assigned to new treatment. These estimates are reported in Panel B of Table 4 .
What we see is that PPIs tend to perform better than H 2 -blockers and H 2 -blockers sometimes better, sometimes worse than prostaglandins in 50% clinical trials without correction for selection bias. (Recall that PPI's are always being tested interactions between these indicators and the probability of treatment d j , and trial characteristics (exclusion criteria and exclusion criteria interacted with d j ); (2) includes (1) plus treatment characteristics (antacid role, daily frequency of medication, total daily dosage interacted with class of ulcer medication) and control characteristics (total daily dosage interacted with whether the control is an H 2 -blocker); (3) includes (1) plus patient characteristics (male, smoker, log age) in the treatment arm interacted with class of treatment and patient characteristics in the control arm interacted with whether the control is an H 2 -blocker; and (4) includes all of the above. The results are robust to common sense modifications of these specifications, including further interactions with d j .
Table 4
Estimates of corrected treatment effects and selection bias Table 4 reports that the difference between biased and unbiased estimates of treatment effects is roughly half the size of treatment effects in 50% trials of H 2 -blockers and PPIs. In trials of prostaglandins, however, the bias is roughly 2 to 6 times the size of treatment effects. In other words, in prostaglandin trials, self-selection appears to change the sign of treatment effects. A treatment that is worse than control actually appears to perform better than control without a correction for selection bias!
Alternative design
There is an alternative trial design that would permit the estimation of relevant treatment effects without bias from patient self-selection. Instead of offering patients a lottery over new treatment and the investigator's choice of control, placebo or conventional therapy, the design would offer a lottery over new treatment and the patient's choice of control, placebo or conventional therapy. (The alternative trial would offer the same probability of assignment to new treatment as the standard trial.) The two designs are illustrated in Fig. 1. 
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The intuition behind the modified design is that the population of interest -defined to include only those who prefer the new treatment -includes two subgroups: those who prefer no treatment to conventional treatment and those who prefer conventional treatment to no treatment. The former will choose as their control placebo and the latter will choose conventional treatment. 23 Both subgroups, however, will enroll in the trial regardless of the probability of receiving new treatment, and estimates of treatment effects will not depend on this probability.
There are two problems with this design. First, the researcher will only be able to estimate the effect of new treatment 22 The alternative design is identical to offering both a placebo-control and a conventional-control trial to the same general patient population. The design is similar, but not identical, to an unblinded trial. There we assume the patient assigned to placebo control will seek conventional treatment outside the trial. But because the patient may not report this to the researcher, estimates of treatment effects relative to placebo will be polluted with estimates of treatment effects relative to conventional control. 23 In more formal terms, whereas the selection equation for a placebo-controlled trial is given by dπ 1 > max {0,π 2 }, the selection equation for the alternative trial would be max {dπ 1 , dπ 1 + (1 − d)π 2 } > max {0,π 2 }, which collapses to the definition of the population of interest (2). relative to conventional treatment for the subgroup that prefers a conventional control. That information, however, is more valuable to this subgroup than an estimate of the effect of treatment relative to placebo. Second, the alternative design requires a larger sample size, and is therefore more expensive, than the standard placebocontrolled trial. The required sample size is not double, however, because the same outcomes in the new treatment arm can be used to calculate the effect of new treatment relative both to placebo and to conventional control. For example, in a parallel-armed trial, the sample size increment is only 50%. 24 The relevant question for the researcher, then, is whether selection bias is significant enough to warrant the extra cost of a larger sample.
Conclusion
This paper not only suggests that medical trials are subject to selection bias, but that this bias causes standard estimators to overstate treatment effects. The result is intuitive: experiments on a new treatment attract patients that are optimistic about the new treatment, and these patients probably respond better to that treatment. There is no reason to think the finding does not generalize to social experiments.
The analysis that led to this result also raises some more fundamental questions about evaluation of treatment effects. First, how do individuals form their beliefs about a new treatment, beliefs that are assumed to guide their decision whether to participate in a research study? Do they predict that new treatment has the same incremental benefit as the average medical innovation? Or do they simply experience Knightian uncertainty? If so, does decisionmaking under such uncertainty play out -with respect to study participation -like decisionmaking under risk? Second, how can one identify treatment effects in the relevant population in the presence of learning? The concern is that, if a study finds that new treatment has, say, a higher treatment effect than conventional treatment, people who previously preferred conventional treatment may now prefer the new treatment. The average treatment effect may be different in this larger population of interest than in the pre-study population of interest. This problem is an example of the principle that observation changes the system being observed. 24 Schouten (1999) derives the following approximation for sample sizes for a two-group trial where one group (n 2 ) is γ times as large as the other (n 1 ): where the groups are assumed to have the same variances σ 2 , α is the desired significance level, β is the desired power, and δ is the difference the researcher would like to detect. This equation implies that the total number of patients required with unequal groups is (1 + γ ) 2 /4γ times the number required with equal group sizes. If the treatment group will be used for comparison to both controls, then γ = 2. Therefore, the total number of patients required is 9/8 that with equal group sizes. This means, instead of two trials with equal groups, the researcher will require one trial with 9/8 the size of an equal group trial and a second trial with just the smaller group, i.e., 9/8 × 1/3. Summing the two yields a factor of 3/2. 
To demonstrate this step, perform a change of variable from y to w = u (y) so thatπ ki is the distribution of w when y is distributed π ki for k = 1, 2 andp 1i is the distribution of w when y is distributed p 1i . Perform a second change of variable so thatĝ j is the distribution of W (j) = E j (w) among the population, for j = p 1i ,π 1i ,π 2i . Now (11) can be written more simply as
Because every distribution is first-order stochastically dominated by a left-truncated version of that same distribution and because first-order stochastic dominance implies third-order stochastic dominance, (12) Because the change of variable alters how an integral is written but not the value of the integral, (11) can be written as (10).
